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REFLECTIONS ON JUDGE WEINSTEIN'S
ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. *
I. JUDGE WEINSTEIN APPRECIATED
Jack Weinstein was one of my teachers at Columbia Law School.
As a young professor he was already a master of his subject and was to
become master teacher. About the time I graduated-in the same year
that the Supreme Court published the legal watershed Brown v. Board of
Education -Jack became Chief Reporter for a New York State commis-
sion charged with comprehensively revising the rules of New York civil
procedure. He performed the task superbly, given the constraints of the
almost suffocatingly conservative New York bench, bar, and legislature.
He was to become the authoritative expositor of the New York Civil
Practice Act and Rules, always seeking to reconcile arcane technicalities
with the larger purposes and values of procedural justice.
Jack later became County Counsel for Nassau County in a Demo-
cratic administration that temporarily relieved the monolithic patronage
system maintained by the Republicans. As chief legal adviser to a large
municipal corporation performing a broad range of public functions, he
became conversant with the legal problems of government from the in-
side. He also acquired more than a journeyman's conversance with local
politics and mastered the art of being an honest man of the law in a
political bear pit.
Thereafter, as a result of his preeminent professorial and profes-
sional stature, his open and judicious temperament, his intimate knowl-
edge of the law of civil procedure, his extraordinary intelligence and
diligence, his experience in government and public law, his dedication to
the public good-and his close acquaintance with the Democratic chief
executive of Nassau County-Jack was appointed United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of New York. In this position Judge
Weinstein has handled every kind of judicial matter, from relatively rou-
tine personal injury litigation and criminal prosecutions to some of the
most complex and politically charged matters that the courts are called
on to address-including mass tort litigation.
• Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Jack subsequently became Chief Judge of the Eastern District. As
Chief Judge he not only undertook the usual administrative responsibili-
ties of a presiding judge but also broke new ground in using the authority
of the office to strengthen the administration of the court, the interface
with the prosecutor's office, and the court's relationships with counter-
part state courts and with the bar.
Along the way he established himself as a master of the law of evi-
dence. He is coauthor of the leading casebook on evidence and of the
definitive treatise on federal evidence law. His preeminence in adjective
law-the law of evidence and procedure-is significant in itself. More-
over, comprehending the law of evidence and procedure has required
him to become familiar with every branch of substantive law. In addi-
tion, he has continually involved himself in a nonjudicial capacity in all
manner of law reform endeavors. Judge Weinstein thus is a preeminent
legal generalist in the classic sense.
Many of Jack's students, colleagues, and admirers, among which I
am privileged to number, have pondered why he was never elevated to
the Second Circuit, or indeed to the Supreme Court. Certainly it was not
for want of qualifications, except perhaps an inability to close his mind to
the ugly social realities that underlie the cases which find their way into
the courts. We often harken to Tocqueville's observation that "[t]here is
hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or
later turn into a judicial one."' 2 Judge Weinstein could well respond:
"Tell me about it." There is no judge at any level in any jurisdiction in
this country who has engaged those questions more seriously, more con-
scientiously, more intelligently, and more imaginatively than Jack
Weinstein.
II. MAss TORTS
There are mass torts and mass torts. The most massive personal
injury tort is the asbestos litigation. The asbestos cases, in which many
other judges in addition to Judge Weinstein have been involved, number
in the hundreds of thousands. The first claimants were industrial work-
ers who were directly exposed to intensive concentrations of asbestos,
particularly World War II shipyard workers who sprayed asbestos as a
fire retardant inside ship hulls. Other claimants were construction work-
ers who applied asbestos to the steel skeletons of buildings as a fire re-
tardant, workers who installed plaster or insulation batting containing
asbestos, and workers who fabricated or installed products in which as-
bestos was a component, such as rubber products in which asbestos was a
binder. Others were workers whose exposure to asbestos was less intense
or continuous.
2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 248 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds.,
1966).
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The number of claimants in the asbestos cases is large and the condi-
tion and extent of their exposure various. The number and heterogeneity
of those called upon to answer for asbestos claims also has been large.
Defendants include the manufacturers of asbestos itself; manufacturers
of asbestos products and products containing asbestos; and companies
that fabricated, installed, or used products containing asbestos. Also
sued were companies that might have engaged in such activities, because
claimants' attorneys often lacked definite information about their clients'
actual exposure and had to anticipate that any specific defendant might
point to someone else as responsible. Also involved was virtually every
casualty and liability insurer doing business in the United States, whom
the courts came to hold liable for broadly extended coverages.
Conspicuous for its absence among those subjected to legal responsi-
bility was the United States government, although the government had
been in a position to avoid or mitigate much of the suffering.
Less massive but still very large was the Agent Orange litigation, the
major part of which came before Judge Weinstein. This litigation in-
volved claims on behalf of Vietnam veterans and their families for dam-
age to health resulting from exposure to a defoliant used by our military
to strip the jungle in which the soldiers had been called to fight. Like the
asbestos litigation, the Agent Orange cases involved heterogeneous
claimants with widely varying exposure, different manifestations, and un-
even latency. The Agent Orange litigation was less difficult than the as-
bestos cases because it involved far fewer claimants. However, the Agent
Orange litigation was even more difficult than the asbestos cases because
of the dimension known in science as etiology and in law as proximate
cause: whether or not the maladies of the claimants, or some of them,
were actually caused by Agent Orange. By 1980 it had become legally
indisputable that many asbestos claimants were victims of asbestos. This
has not yet become clear for the Agent Orange claimants. The Agent
Orange litigation was also more difficult because it directly questioned
the fairness and consideration with which the government dealt with
those who gave service to the common good.
As in the asbestos cases, the United States government was conspic-
uous for its absence among those subjected to legal responsibility for the
Agent Orange claims. Its absence is particularly ironic because the gov-
ernment itself was responsible for the Vietnam War and for the means by
which it was fought.
Mass torts of lesser scale include various kinds of drug and prosthe-
sis cases-Bendectin, DES, Dalkon Shield, breast implants, and heart
valves. Each set of cases has specific characteristics in the number of
claimants, the nature and variety of the injuries asserted, the relative un-
certainty of the causal antecedent of injury, and the identity and number
of those charged with legal responsibility. Some cases are fairly simple in
one or more of these characteristics, involving a definite number of vic-
88:569 (1994)
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tims with a definite causal chain to one or a few defendants. However,
compared with most multiparty litigation the drug and prosthesis cases
are still extremely complicated, if for no other reason than the problems
in measurement of damages.
Still less complicated, or usually so, are the "single event" mass torts
such as air crash cases, the Hyatt Skywalk case, the MGM Grand and
DuPont Plaza hotel fire cases, the construction site disaster in
Bridgeport, Connecticut, and the civil litigation emerging from the
World Trade Center bombing.
Mass tort cases involve anywhere from dozens to thousands of
claimants, with more or less corresponding numbers of plaintiffs' law-
yers; multiple defendants and third-party respondents; legal and factual
theories designed to maximize contributions to the recovery fund; myriad
depositions, documents disclosure, and expert testimony; multiple insur-
ers and reinsurers charged with secondary liability; multijudge adminis-
tration involving magistrates, special masters, and settlement mediators;
and coordination by committees among plaintiffs' lawyers, defense law-
yers, judges, parajudicial officers, and delegations representing claimants
and respondents and interested third parties (such as indemnitors).
There is another common feature in these mass torts. They involve
claims for money-big money for plaintiffs' lawyers and for many of the
claimants themselves, big monetary obligations for the defendants and
their insurers, and relatively good and steady money for defense lawyers.
Monetary measure determines who will be plaintiffs and defendants and
also the contours of the proceedings. Accordingly, new types of financial
interests have evolved. On one side, the contingent fee agreement has
become a kind of "futures" contract in which lawyers have an exclusive
right to trade. On the other side, the long term income flows accruing
from the business operations of the respondents-defendants and their
insurers-are subject to a new kind of entitlement claim, competing with
those of shareholders and traditional creditors. Money is thus both the
compelling object of this kind of litigation and the means by which it has
taken its distinctive form.
III. MASS TORTS OF A DIFFERENT KIND
It is noteworthy that in analyzing mass tort litigation Judge Wein-
stein makes passing reference to the Mark Twain school case.3 That case
strongly resembles the asbestos and Agent Orange cases in ways beyond
those addressed by Judge Weinstein's Article.
The Mark Twain school case4 was Judge Weinstein's engagement
with Brown v. Board of Education and, more generally, the civil rights/
3 Jack B. Weinstein, EthicalDilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 473-74,
489, 540, 542 (1994).
4 Hart v. District 21, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
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discrimination/poverty litigation ensuing since Brown. The claim in the
Mark Twain case was, among other things, that children of low income
families in New York City's public schools were denied equal protection
of law because the resources available for their educational needs were
disproportionately low compared to the resources provided for other
children. Such a claim, as we have come to realize, impinges on a local-
ity's whole social fabric and involves not only complex legal issues but
virtually all political, economic, fiscal, psychological, religious, and
moral aspects of modem experience.
In responding to the plaintiffs' grievance in the Mark Twain case,
Judge Weinstein eventually involved not only the parties and their law-
yers but also New York's central school bureaucracy, parent groups, the
teachers' union, the union of school administrators, and various private
social service agencies, experts, consultants, and parajudicial assistants.
He tried to fashion a decree that would make school a better place, chil-
dren's education a better experience, and the social environment more
supportive. As a judicial undertaking, Judge Weinstein's judgment in the
Mark Twain case was an "institutional decree" on a grand scale.
However, the scale and scope of Judge Weinstein's decision was
hardly more sweeping than the decision in a subsequent public school
case, Jenkins v. Missouri.5 In Jenkins, the judge did nothing less than
reorganize a metropolitan school district and its system of finance, in-
cluding state-level financial commitments. The judge concluded, quite
reasonably, that no less drastic remedy would mitigate inequality in edu-
cational opportunity, particularly for blacks in racially balkanized cities.
The decree in the Jenkins case has been sustained by the higher courts, 6
although it remains to be seen how long the reorganization will remain
viable without continuing political participation by voter-taxpayers.
Nevertheless, Judge Weinstein's counterpart disposition in the Mark
Twain case, so far as it went beyond the school immediately involved,
was held to go beyond appropriate judicial authority; 7 the New York
City schools remain about as they were before Mark Twain, or worse. In
any event, the decrees in the Mark Twain and Kansas City school cases
involve procedural and structural departures from conventional adjudi-
cation that are as radical as those that have evolved in the mass tort
personal injury cases.
Although Judge Weinstein does not quite call them such, school
cases and other "institutional decree" litigation can be conceived as in-
volving mass torts. Lack of equal opportunity for an effective education
is certainly a personal injury in some sense of the term. So are suffering
inhumane conditions in prisons and mental institutions, homelessness,
5 672 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd in part, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'd in part,
495 U.S. 33 (1990).
6 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
7 See Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 56 (2d Cir. 1975).
88:569 (1994)
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inadequate medical care, and racial discrimination in public housing.
These mass tort poverty-discrimination cases have arisen in virtually
every large community in the United States and in many smaller ones.
Their genesis has been over the same period as the asbestos claims and
other mass personal injury torts.
The litigation in the mass tort poverty-discrimination cases resem-
bles the mass tort personal injury cases in yet other ways, including those
discussed by Judge Weinstein: multiple party joinder of plaintiffs and
respondents; use of the class suit device as the procedural structure;
novel roles for counsel, court, parajudicial officers, experts, and commu-
nity representatives; complex problems of causation and evidence, for ex-
ample, differentiating the significance of race, class, and family structure
on educational achievement and assessing the significance of "de facto"
desegregation in the public schools; and problems of communication,
community, participation, and individual dignity and autonomy.
Moreover, most of the ethical problems in the mass personal injury
cases have direct analogues in the mass decree cases: attenuation of the
relationship between claimants and their counsel; conflict of interest
among claimants and between claimants and counsel; difficulty in identi-
fying the responsible respondents; ambiguity and conflict in the relation-
ship between the respondents and their counsel; substitution of
settlement procedures in place of adjudication; and assumption by the
judge of a "managerial" role. Indeed, the managerial role of judges in
"institutional decree cases" following Brown v. Board of Education beg-
gars that in the damages cases. It is singularly in the latter, however,
that managerial judging has elicited criticism by advocates of individual
rights.
IV. THE FORMS AND LIMITS OF ADJUDICATION
Around the time Brown v. Board of Education was decided, and
before the mass tort personal injury cases began to appear, Professor Lon
Fuller wrote and informally disseminated an article entitled The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication. The article indeed may have been a veiled
commentary on the Brown decision; perhaps that was the reason it was
not formally published until much later.8 At all events, because Profes-
sor Fuller was at Harvard Law School and was among the preeminent
legal theorists of the time, the article had great influence in analysis of
the legal process. In retrospect, the analysis seems unpersuasive. Never-
theless, Professor Fuller had a point, although-to borrow an advertence
from Harry Kalven-not quite the one he was making.
The problem Professor Fuller addressed was the relationship be-
tween legal claims (substantive claims of legal entitlement) and adjudica-
tive procedure (the process for hearing and deciding substantive claims of
8 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
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legal entitlement). In essence, his thesis was, first, that only a certain
type of claim could be framed as a legal claim; and second, that the adju-
dicative process, involving bilateral presentation of evidence and argu-
ment based on definite legal premises, is uniquely appropriate for
resolution of this type of claim. The linkage of these two propositions
was this: legal claims and defenses consist of uniquely reasoned conten-
tions about facts and legal norms, and adjudication consists of uniquely
reasoned responses to such contentions.
Two related implications followed from this analysis. First, a claim
that could not be presented in the form of such reasoned contentions is
not a proper legal claim. Second, and correlatively, only proper legal
claims (as thus defined) are within the proper jurisdiction of the courts.
Hence, the title of Professor Fuller's paper: The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication.
Implicit but not articulated in the analysis was a politically charged
constitutional proposition: when a claim entails an indefinite legal prem-
ise and a factual frame of reference that is wider than can be accommo-
dated through bilateral party presentation, then the claim is not properly
susceptible of adjudication. In technical terms, such a claim is not a
"case or controversy" and hence is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.
However, reflection about "public issue" cases, of which Brown v.
Board of Education is the paradigm, shows that these cases do not in-
volve either definite legal premises or factual frames of reference that can
be accommodated through bilateral party presentation. The claim as-
serted in Brown involved a very ambiguous legal idea (if also a basic legal
ideal)-that of equality-and a factual frame of reference that embraced
the entire social history of the United States. Ever since the decision in
Brown our legal institutions have been trying to work out the legal prem-
ise of that case. What is meant by legal equality was the issue, for exam-
ple, that defeated Professor Lani Guinier's nomination as Assistant
Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division.
Professor Chayes's seminal article9 (referred to by Judge Weinstein)
has explained how the "form" of adjudication in public issue cases radi-
cally departs from the model projected by Professor Fuller. So far as the
"limits" of adjudication are concerned, Professor Chayes's article as-
sumes that they are wide, if not unbounded. Given the undertakings in
which the courts have been involved, including the mass torts that Judge
Weinstein discusses, Professor Chayes's assumption is surely correct.
After all, if a court is willing to undertake reorganization of an urban
school district-in Boston or New York or Kansas City-or to recon-
struct the electoral system for the legislative branch, or to hold a Presi-
9 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281
(1976).
88:569 (1994)
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dent in contempt of court, what undertaking remains outside the
province of the judiciary?
Any social controversy can be put in the form of a bilateral legal and
factual argument over a claim of legal right. Advocates and judges do it
every day. On this point Professor Fuller was simply wrong: there is no
inherent restraint in the form of adjudication, at least in the American
version, nor any inherent limit on its subject matter.
Correlatively, resolution of any social controversy can also be put in
other forms, also without inherent limits. The participants in these other
forms have different roles and responsibilities from those in adjudication
and are subject to different ethical norms. One traditional form is execu-
tive dispensation. That was the form in which most public matters were
resolved in traditional kingships. Even in political democracies executive
dispensation can confer such things as grants-in-aid or appointment to a
government office and can also give forth legislation such as administra-
tive regulations. Another "form" is the work of legislators. They too
can adopt measures applicable to whole classes of persons or make spe-
cific awards. Legislative dispensations through private bills are still
made in the present day, and such was the form in which much of the
public business was done in colonial times.
In this light it is worth considering whether Professor Fuller never-
theless had a point.
V. THE NEW PROCEDURAL REGIME
The forms and limits of conventional adjudication have been sub-
stantially transformed in both the mass personal injury cases and the in-
stitutional discrimination-poverty cases. The transformation has
involved uses of procedural mechanisms in nominal conformity with tra-
dition but with the effect, through incremental changes in meaning and
use, of creating quasi-judicial institutions of novel scope and scale. Sali-
ent among the adaptations, which Judge Weinstein recapitulates, have
been these:
-In the mass personal injury cases, modifications of class suit proce-
dure have been used to evaluate and provide redress in the form of damages
for large cohorts of individual claimants; in the institutional discrimination-
poverty cases, the class suit procedure has been adapted to evaluate and
provide redress in the form of services (such as educational services) for
even larger cohorts of individual claimants.
-In the mass personal injury cases, evidentiary procedure has been
adapted to administer standardized tests for eligibility and formulas for re-
covery from settlement funds, in place of individual adjudication; in the
institutional discrimination-poverty cases, the decrees are predicated on
similarly developed standards for provision of public services.
-In the mass personal injury cases, the right of a lawyer to communi-
cate about need for legal services, envisioned as a right to protect the legally
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untutored, has become a means by which plaintiffs' lawyers present them-
selves as the official representatives of claimant constituencies; in the insti-
tutional discrimination-poverty cases, the same right has become a means
by which private activist organizations similarly establish themselves.
-In both types of cases, the class suit notification procedure has been
adapted to provide the communication system among the cohorts of claim-
ants, the respondent institutions and their officials, and the lawyers and
judges who manage the system.
-In both types of cases, the crucial adjudications concern the com-
mon questions affecting the claimants as a class, expressed as general rules,
rather than the application of law to specific individual facts.
-In both types of cases, the modal method of disposition is settle-
ment, not adjudication.
-In both types of litigation, the cumulative result of these changes are
new entitlement programs, the one type dispensing money from private
sources, the other type dispensing services from public sources.
The new judicially administered entitlement programs were not
planned, nor did they originate as directives from high political author-
ity. They are the product of myriad interconnected ad hoe adjudications
and "bargains in the shadow of the law." 10 Generally these programs are
poorly organized and are administered by people having no training and
usually little taste for administration. The mass personal injury entitle-
ment programs have been shown to involve extremely high "transaction
costs"; the programs decreed in the discrimination-poverty cases proba-
bly also involve high transaction costs. This is not to say that these enti-
tlement programs are illegitimate. As practical people would say, what
are the alternatives?
Nevertheless, in both types of cases, the roles and responsibilities of
the lawyers and judges are in important ways incompatible with those in
the ordinary litigation whose "forms and limits" Professor Fuller had in
mind.
VI. DIFFERENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: DIFFERENT ETHICS
The roles of judges and lawyers in the new entitlement programs
resemble those of members of tripartite administrative commissions, as-
sisted by staff and interacting with constituent interest groups. A posi-
tive analogy would be to the Securities and Exchange Commission and
other agencies having reputation for technical competence, efficiency,
disinterestedness, circumspection, and responsibility. A less positive
analogy would be to the Federal Communications Commission or state
workers' compensation commissions, where partisan interests are intense
and overtly political. A still less positive analogy would be to local plan-
ning and zoning commissions or public works boards.
10 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
88:569 (1994)
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The point of making such analogies is that if we are to understand
the ethical problems posed in mass tort cases, whether involving personal
injury or discrimination-poverty, we should address the web of interests,
power, authority, and responsibility in which the operatives in these new
institutions function. Practical ethical problems-the kind Judge Wein-
stein is addressing-arise from specific social situations, not from the
question of how life should be lived in the abstract. The web of interests,
power, authority, and responsibility of the participants within and before
the SEC, the FCC, or a local zoning board is not the same as that of the
participants in ordinary personal injury or contract litigation. By the
same token, neither is the web of interests, power, and social relation-
ships of participants in courts handling mass tort litigation the same as
that in ordinary litigation.
Given the fundamental differences between the roles and responsi-
bilities of bench and bar in ordinary litigation and those called forth in
mass tort litigation, the question is how far rules designed for the former
can be stretched to accommodate the latter. Judge Weinstein's analysis
would suggest that severe distortion of traditional professional norms has
occurred. This is not to say that mass tort litigation could not be prop-
erly governed by a proper set of ethical norms. It is to say that recogni-
tion of the differences would entail an acceptance of the proposition that
the ethical values protected by traditional professional norms-individu-
alization of litigation objectives, personalized communication, confidenti-
ality and loyalty on the part of the lawyer, and corresponding focus by
the judge-cannot be fully realized in mass tort litigation. In short, reali-
zation of individualized process values is incompatible with realization of
mass substantive dispositions, which is what mass tort litigation seeks to
achieve. This could be the point, so far as professional ethics is con-
cerned, of Professor Fuller's conception of the forms and limits of tradi-
tional adjudication.
For alternative ethical models, should we examine the norms gov-
erning those who wield authority in legislatures and city councils or in
corporations and labor unions?
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